

~~SECRET~~

(872)

[REDACTED]

PAGE 001

TOT: 10 [REDACTED] FEB 87

CIA [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

TO: DIRNSA, DEPT OF STATE//INR/DSTAD, DIA, TREASURY DEPT,  
SECRET SERVICE//ID, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,  
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM, ZEN/CIA OFFICE OF CURRENT OPERATIONS,  
USCINCSO QHTS PANAMA.

[REDACTED]

TEXT

PASS: NSA FOR ZKZK OO DLS DE (FOR NSOC).

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WARNING: INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

[REDACTED]

Declassified and  
Approved for Release  
July 2000

~~SECRET~~

Page 1

~~SECRET~~

DIST: 09 FEBRUARY 1987

COUNTRY: CHILE

SUBJ: COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHILE [REDACTED] DISCUSSION  
[REDACTED] CONCERNING SECOND ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT  
AGAINST PRESIDENT PINOCHET

DOI: [REDACTED] JANUARY 1987

SUMMARY: [REDACTED]

TEXT: 1. ACCORDING TO A [REDACTED] MEMBER OF THE CHILEAN COMMUNIST PARTY (PCCH), THE PCCH [REDACTED] REAFFIRMED, [REDACTED] AN EARLIER DECISION TO MAINTAIN AS AN OPTION A SECOND ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT AGAINST CHILEAN PRESIDENT AUGUSTO ((PINOCHET)) UGARTE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] WAS CHARACTERIZED BY A SERIOUS DEBATE ON THE RAMIFICATIONS OF A SECOND ATTEMPT. THERE WAS GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT A SUCCESSFUL ASSASSINATION OF PINOCHET WOULD BRING A STRONG REPRESSIVE RESPONSE FROM THE GOVERNMENT OF CHILE (GOC), AND DOUBT WAS EXPRESSED THAT THE PCCH, UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, COULD WITHSTAND IT.

2. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] AS EVIDENCE, IT WAS STATED THAT APPROXIMATELY THREE HUNDRED PCCH AND MANUEL RODRIGUEZ PATRIOTIC FRONT (FPMR) MEMBERS WERE BELIEVED TO HAVE BEEN ARRESTED

SINCE AUGUST 1986, AND OVER 1,200 MEMBERS EITHER LEFT CHILE OR WENT INTO HIDING DURING THE SAME PERIOD. SEVERAL SAFEHOUSES HAD BEEN COMPROMISED OR WERE DROPPED FOR SECURITY REASONS, AND AN IMPORTANT CLANDESTINE MEDICAL CLINIC DISCOVERED BY SECURITY SERVICES.

3. [REDACTED]

~~SECRET~~

4. [REDACTED]

5. [REDACTED]

6. ALSO DISCUSSED [REDACTED] WAS THE POSSIBILITY OF TARGETTING OTHER MILITARY OFFICERS IN PLACE OF PINOCHET. A PREVIOUS DECISION TO TARGET RETIRED ARMY GENERAL AND FORMER DIRECTOR

OF THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (DINA), MANUEL ((CONTRERAS)) SEPULVEDA, WAS QUESTIONED AS BEING VERY DIFFICULT TO ACCOMPLISH DUE TO THE HEAVY SECURITY AROUND CONTRERAS AND THE FACT HE IS ALMOST A RECLUSE. IT WAS SUGGESTED THAT A MORE ACCESSIBLE TARGET BE CHOSEN, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE GOC RESPONSE SHOULD THE TARGET BE ASSASSINATED. THERE WAS AGREEMENT THAT RETIRED ARMY GENERAL SERGIO ((ARELLANO)) STARK WAS A GOOD TARGET BECAUSE OF HIS PAST CONNECTION WITH THE MURDERS AND DISAPPEARANCES OF LEFTISTS IN NORTHERN CHILE IN THE WAKE OF THE 1973 COUP.

7. [REDACTED]

8. [REDACTED] COMMENT: IT APPEARS THE [REDACTED] IS TAKING A MORE SERIOUS LOOK AT THE POSSIBLE RAMIFICATIONS OF A SECOND ATTEMPT ON PINOCHET, PROBABLY AS A RESULT OF THE CRACKDOWN BY GOC SECURITY SERVICES AFTER THE FIRST ATTEMPT. THIS CRACKDOWN, WHICH IS NOT OVER YET, HAS HAD FAR-REACHING CONSEQUENCES IN ARRESTS, SAFEHOUSE DISCOVERIES AND A LOSS OF PRESTIGE. THE PCCH IS FULLY AWARE OF THE POWERS VESTED IN THE ARMY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR ON THIS CASE, FERNANDO ((TORRES)), AND PROBABLY FEARS FUTURE SETBACKS, WHICH WILL TEMPER ANY DECISION TO GO AHEAD WITH A PLAN.)

[REDACTED]

Page (of) 4

DENIED IN TOTO